An Inquiry into the Reasons for the Moral Treatment of Animals: Between Moral Individualism and Holism
Author: Fan-Ching Leung ( Department of Philosophy, Tunghai University, Assistant Professor )
Vol.&No.：Vol. 69, No. 2
Date：September 2024
Pages：79-98
DOI：https://doi.org/10.6210/JNTNU.202409_69(2).0004
Abstract：
The main purpose of this article is to explore the reasons for the moral treatment of animals. It asserts that, in addition to “capacity-based reasons,” “relation-based reasons,” and “natural environmental value-based reasons,” there are also “inherent-value-based reasons” and reasons from the Capabilities Approach. These five reasons for the moral treatment of animals can form a spectrum of reasons, which can further expand the moral justification for the treatment of animals when explored along this spectrum. Throughout the discussion, the article will demonstrate the difficulties encountered by these different reasons and how subsequent doctrines can more comprehensively address these issues. The article posits that Martha C. Nussbaum’s Capability Approach is currently the most appropriate reason for the moral treatment of animals, as it considers the diversity and differences of animals, does not merely regard animals as means, accords them dignity based on the animality of different species, and its moral reasoning can protect a wide and diverse range of animals.
Keywords：intrinsic value, inherent value, species norm, individualism, capabilities approach
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