A Buddhist Perspective on the Environment
Author: Shih Chao-Hwei ( Department of Religion and Culture, Hsuan Chuang University, Professor )
Vol.&No.:Vol. 69, No. 2
Date:September 2024
Pages:27-52
DOI:https://doi.org/10.6210/JNTNU.202409_69(2).0002
Abstract:
This article expounds on the Buddhist approach to how it regards the environment. It starts with the definition and scope of the Buddhist term Loka. The term “Loka” means the worlds in which humans, animals, plants, microorganisms, and inanimate objects exist. There are two types of worlds, the Sattva-Loka (Sentient being world), which includes all beings with perceptions (humans and animals), but not plants; and the Bhājana-Loka (Container world) which refers to a survival environment comprised of plants, microorganisms and inanimate objects. Then, from a discussion of the definition and the meaning of the core concepts: dependent origination, protection of life, and the middle path, a complete discourse regarding Buddhist environmental ethics in practice and in theory unfolds. Following that, an investigation of the scope, characteristics, and ethical status of animals, plants, inanimate objects and microorganisms ensues in the following order: 1. The core ethical concern of Buddhism is focused on sentient beings because of their perception capability. Animals, like humans have many emotions including joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, and they also have perceptions of suffering. Therefore, when talking about the aspects of sympathy and empathy, these should not be limited to humans only but expanded to all sentient beings. However, when confronted with animals that might threaten the safety and survival of human lives, the Buddhist ideal of total protection of life may not always be possible. Rather, relative best choices which may eliminate the lives of animals need to be made, which is the ethical action that follows the middle path. 2. Even if many plants thrive, their perception is thought to be less keen than animals. In addition, sentient beings have a fundamental survival instinct, and it is necessary at a minimum for them to consume plants in order to stay alive. Therefore, Buddhism does not consider plants to have the same ethical status as animals. However, in taking Buddhist vows, monastics are required to treat plants with as much care and respect as possible. 3. Even though microorganisms possess some characteristics of living creatures, compared to plants, they are not visible to the naked eye. They are ubiquitous, which makes it difficult for humans to develop an action plan based on an ethical attitude toward them. Even so, the Buddha still asked monastics to try their best not to harm microorganisms. 4. Inanimate components have no instincts to “avoid death and suffering or attempt to live and seek happiness”. Nor do they possess any sign of vitality. Therefore, from the Buddhist perspective, these inanimate components can be regarded as instruments that humans, animals, and plants rely on for survival. Although their existence is regarded as instrumental, humans should still hold ethical attitudes such as cherishing and gratitude toward them. Finally, there is a brief introduction to aspects of modern environmental ethics including the philosophies of Holism, Individualism, Land Ethics, and Deep Ecology, followed by a response to these from the Buddhist perspective.
Keywords:container world ( Bh?jana-Loka ), dependent origination ( prat?tya-samutp?da ), protection of life, sentient being world ( Sattva-Loka ), the middle path ( madhyam?-m?rga )
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